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1 Introduction
In many countries we observe a quite active merger control. However, an outright ban of a
merger is rather seldom the action taken by the antitrust authorities. Instead we see that
the antitrust authorities quite often require that the merging parties modify the merger,
either through structural remedies (for example divestiture of assets) or behavioral remedies
(for example specic contractual arrangements).1 Unfortunately, most theoretical studies of
merger control do not allow for remedies. The purpose of this article is to help ll this gap
in the literature. We investigate the welfare e¤ect of introducing merger remedies in the
presence of possible mistakes by the antitrust authorities and possible deterrence e¤ects of
merger control. It is found that an introduction of merger remedies can make it less likely that
the worst mergers are deterred, and that allowing for remedies might lead to lower welfare
even if the worst mergers are deterred.
Introducing remedies as an option might signal a softmerger policy and thereby en-
courage rms to merge.2 There are empirical studies that investigate how remedies impact
the number of proposed mergers. Seldeslachts et al. (2009) use cross-section data from 28
countries of the number of mergers (frequency) and conclude that prohibition decisions deter,
whereas conditional approvals through the application of merger remedies do not. Clougherty
and Seldeslachts (2013) look at US merger deterrence using a similar method. They examine
composition-based and frequency-based deterrence in the US, and nd that launching an
investigation and challenging a merger have signicant deterrent e¤ects, but prohibitions do
not signicantly involve more deterrence than remedies.
Even if the empirical studies do help us understand how allowing for remedies may a¤ect
the number of proposed mergers, they do not help us to understand the welfare e¤ect of
1Leveque and Shelanski (2003) provide an overview of the use of merger remedies in the US and EU. For
a more recent review of the use of merger remedies in EU, see Motta et al. (2007).
2According to Neven et al. (1993, p.7) "lawyers in particular are aware that this may give them signicant
bargaining power with the (European) Commission even in doubtful cases". Note that this clearly goes against
the original expectation about the possibility of a remedial action - according to Baer and Redcay (2003), the
requirement to le a pre-merger notication and wait pending the agencys review was reckoned to increase
the negotiation power of the agency, because an eventual litigation over the remedy involved supplementary
delay, so rms were expected to become more inclined to accept the settlement terms requested by the agency.
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remedies.3 Could it be that consumers would be better o¤ without remedies as a policy
alternative? To pinpoint the mechanisms at play, we apply a theoretical model. We allow for
both type I and type II errors by antitrust authorities, as well as the potential for deterrence
of mergers. As a benchmark we follow Sørgard (2009), and let the antitrust authorities either
ban or clear any merger (remedy is not an option). It is shown that if the quality of merger
control is su¢ ciently high, the worst mergers are deterred. However, the merger investigations
as such can have a detrimental e¤ect on welfare (enforcement e¤ect). The reason is that those
mergers that are investigated are chosen among those that are not deterred. Since the mergers
that have the largest anti-competitive e¤ects are already deterred, this leads to a large risk
of type I errors (prohibiting welfare enhancing mergers). We complement Sørgard (2009) by
allowing for remedies, and comparing the outcome with the benchmark where remedies are
not an option. The purpose is to pin down the factors which make remedies welfare-reducing,
so as to enable a policy discussion on what the antitrust authorities should bear in mind when
allowing for remedies.
It turns out that to address the welfare e¤ect of introducing remedies, it is important
to understand (i) how merger remedies will a¤ect the unconditional clearance rate and (ii)
the change in prots from unconditional to conditional approval (with remedies). At one
extreme, all conditional clearances are replacing unconditional clearances that are present
in a no-remedy regime, and at the other extreme all conditional clearances are replacing
bans that would be present in the no remedy regime. If most of the remedies are replacing
unconditional bans that would be present in a no-remedy regime, and the prot from clearance
with remedies is close to the prot with unconditional clearance, then it is obvious that
introducing remedies as an option will make mergers in general more protable for the rms.
For a given activity level by the agency, this will lead to more mergers being proposed.
We show that introducing remedies as an option can make it more di¢ cult to deter the
worst mergers, those that are most detrimental to welfare. If the rms know that remedies
3Assessing the overall impact of merger control requires to assess both the magnitude of type I and II
errors (banning pro-competitive mergers and clearing anticompetitive ones, respectively) and the degree of
deterrence achieved. While the former may be easier to capture (see for instance Duso et al. (2007) for an
estimation in the European Commissions case), the latter is hard to measure, although the academic literature
agrees on the necessity to take it into account (see for instance Joskow (2002), Crandall and Whinston (2003)
and Baker (2003)).
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would be an option they have more incentives to propose the worst mergers, because there
is a chance that they may be cleared with remedies. It might be that introducing remedies
tips the balance, and suddenly some of the worst mergers are proposed. Then it is obvious
that the overall e¤ect of allowing for remedies is probably negative.
If the agency enjoys a su¢ ciently high quality for its merger control activity, it will succeed
in deterring the worst mergers even if the conditional approval is allowed for. However, it
is still a question how active the agency should be, and for this the agency has to take into
account both the enforcement and the deterrence e¤ect. We show the introduction of remedies
as an option will modify both the enforcement and the deterrence e¤ect. However, given that
the last merger to be deterred is detrimental to welfare, then the deterrence e¤ect is positive
and the enforcement e¤ect (given su¢ ciently low marginal costs) is negative. This is true
even if we allow for remedies, simply because it is benecial for society to deter a merger that
would have had a negative impact on welfare and could be cleared - either unconditionally
or with remedies - if it had been proposed.
Again, allowing for remedies may have a negative impact on welfare. Although the worst
mergers are deterred, allowing for remedies might lead to more mergers being proposed and
then less deterrence on the margin for a given activity level by the agency. Also in this case
it is of importance how the introduction of remedies will a¤ect the unconditional clearance
rate of mergers. If there is only a limited reduction in the rate of unconditional clearance,
then it is likely that more mergers are proposed and thereby fewer mergers with a negative
impact of welfare are deterred. On the other hand, the introduction of remedies will have an
ambiguous e¤ect on the enforcement. Some benecial mergers that initially would have been
banned will now be cleared with remedies, while some benecial mergers that would have
been cleared unconditionally are now solved with remedies.
Finally, we discuss the agencys optimal activity level. Again, it is found that the change in
the unconditional clearance rate following the introduction of remedies as an option is crucial.
If the unconditional clearance rate drops only marginally, that would encourage more rms
to merge. If the worst mergers are deterred initially, then this makes it more likely that the
activity level is higher after the introduction of a merger remedy option. We show that the
change in the unconditional clearance rate must be compared with the di¤erence in welfare
between clearing mergers unconditionally and clearing them with remedies. When considering
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to launch one more merger investigation after allowing for merger remedies, we show that
it is crucial how large e¤ect the marginal investigation has on the number of additionally
deterred merger in a no-remedy regime versus a regime with remedies.
Although merger remedies are widely used by competition authorities, there are only a
limited number of theoretical studies of this policy instrument. These studies are typically
considering structural remedies, where the merging parties are forced to sell out assets or
brands. They nd that introducing remedies might lead to lower consumer welfare.4 In
contrast to those studies, we allow for type I and type II errors in addition to the possible
deterrence e¤ect of merger control.5 This allows us to investigate how an active merger
control will have both a direct e¤ect (on enforcement) and an indirect e¤ect (on deterrence),
and how remedies will inuence the trade-o¤ between the direct and indirect e¤ects.
In the next section we present our basic model. In section 3 we identify the conditions
ensuring that the most harmful mergers are actually abandoned. For the rest of the paper we
assume that the worst mergers are deterred. In section 4 we analyze the trade-o¤ between
the enforcement and the deterrence e¤ect, then section 5 identies the optimal activity level
for the antitrust authorities with and without remedies. The nal section provides some
concluding remarks, and relates to the empirical ndings in the existing literature.
2 Basic assumptions and notations
Consider the set of potential protable mergers of an economy, denoted Y . A given project
y 2 Y may be more or less detrimental to welfare, so one can rank them according to their
4Cabral (2003) shows that any divestiture to an entrant may lead to lower consumer welfare, because the
entrant then might be prevented from introducing its own brand (which in the retail market can be interpreted
as a new store). Vergé (2010) applies a Cournot model, and shows that reallocation of assets to existing rivals
through remedies is detrimental to consumer welfare unless there are su¢ ciently large synergies. Vasconcelos
(2010) also applies a Cournot model, and shows that the potential for remedies can inuence which mergers
are proposed and in some cases lead to lower consumer welfare.
5Cosnita-Langlais and Tropeano (2012) also allow for decision errors due to asymmetric information, but
instead focus on how the potential for remedies will inuence the merging rmsincentives to invest in e¢ ciency
gains. See also Seldeslacht et al. (2010), that also allow for private information. In contrast to us, in the
latter model they assume that antitrust authorities are better informed about the e¤ect of the merger than
the merging parties.
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welfare e¤ect from 0, the least anticompetitive one, to y, the most anticompetitive one.
Denote WM (y) the net welfare impact of merger y, where WM is decreasing in y, and call
y0 the "neutral" merger, i.e. such that WM (y0) = 0. Then WM (0) > 0 and WM (y) < 0 as
long as y0 2 (0; y).
As before mentioned, we only consider privately protable mergers, meaning in the ab-
sence of any merger control. Denote M (y) the joint prot from merger. In order to merge,
the rms need to incur a xed sunk cost C, the same for all, where M (y) > C; 8y:
The competition agency (CA henceforth) conducts merger control with probability N 2
[0; 1], which stands for the probability of investigating any given merger y. Normalize the
cost of merger enforcement to zero. If investigated, the merger project may be either cleared
or banned. We assume that a ban has a zero welfare impact. The decision to clear a merger
however may be of two types: unconditional or subject to remedies. As a result, we are going
to consider and compare throughout the paper two possible regimes, the "strict" one, not
allowing for remedies, and the "remedy" regime, in which the merger approval may involve
remedies.
Thus, let gS denote the probability of approval following investigation in the "strict", no-
remedy regime. As a result, a merger will be banned with probability 1 gS . Furthermore, let
gS = g + h, where g stands for the unconditional approval probability and h stands for the
probability of clearing the merger subject to remedies in the so-called "remedy" regime. Let
us assume from now on that  2 [0; 1] : Thus, gS = g for  = 0, i.e. the probability of clearance
is the same, regardless of the possibility of remedies, but gS = g + h for  = 1, i.e. some
"former" approvals become conditional clearances when remedies are used. In other words,
parameter  = g
S g
h measures to what extent the di¤erence in unconditional approval rates
between the two possible regimes is due to the presence of conditional clearances. Finally, let
gS ; g and h be all strictly decreasing in y: the more anti-competitive a merger, the less likely
the clearance decision, be it unconditional or not.
As compared with the unconditional approval, the conditional clearance leads to di¤erent
prot and welfare e¤ects. Let R(y) denote the joint prot from merger when remedies
apply, with R  M ;8y. In other words, we assume that the remedies are costly for the
merging rms. The net welfare e¤ect when the merger is conditionally accepted will be
denoted WR(y). As for WM (y), we assume that WR(y) is decreasing in y.
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The timing of actions will be the following:
Stage 1: the Competition Agency (CA) determines the probability N of launching an
investigation.
Stage 2: the merging rms (or insiders) decide whether to merge or not.
Stage 3: the CA investigates submitted mergers and each investigated merger is cleared
(possibly under conditions) or banned. Merger control is imperfect: the CA makes both types
of errors.6
The game will be solved by backward induction. The paper aims to compare the outcomes
of the merger policies allowing or not for remedies.
3 Impact of remedies on merger protability and incentives
Given the exogenous probability to clear a merger, conditionally or not, we start by looking
into the outcome of the rmsdecision at the second stage. The insiders will merge only if it
is protable to do so, i.e. if the expected prot is positive given the cost of merging and the
probability to see their merger banned.
In the "strict", no-remedies regime, the expected prot writes:
ES(y) = (1 N)M (y) +NM (y)gS(y)  C
= M (y)

1 N +NgS(y)  C; (1)
where the square bracket stands for the total probability to see the merger materialize, i.e.
of not being investigated (1 N) or of being cleared if investigated (NgS).
In contrast, the merger policy allowing for remedies leads to an expected prot of:
ER(y) = (1 N)M (y) +N M (y)g(y) + R(y)h(y)  C
= M (y) [1 N +Ng(y)] + R(y)Nh(y)  C; (2)
where the square bracket stands for the total probability to see the merger materialize under
the exact form that it was submitted, and the term Nh(y) stands for the probability of
conditional approval in case of investigation.
6To justify this, one can think of the CA receiving a signal imperfectly correlated with the true welfare
e¤ect of the merger.
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Comparing the two above expressions enables us to establish the impact of remedies on
the merger protability, and hence on the private decision to merge:
Proposition 1 Allowing for remedies increases expected merger protability i¤ 
R(y)
M (y)
> .
Proof. Recall that gS = g + h.
Thus ER(y)  ES(y) =  M (y) [1 N +Ng(y)] + R(y)Nh(y)  C
   M (y) [1 N +Ng(y)] +NM (y)h(y)  C = Nh(y) R(y)  M (y) :
Therefore ER(y) > ES(y) i¤ 
R(y)
M (y)
> .
The condition identied in Proposition 1 may be rewritten as g
S g
h <
R(y)
M (y)
; or, equiva-
lently, hR(y) > (gS g)M (y). In other words, the protability of mergers and the incentive
to submit them increase when remedies are possible as long as the relative ratio between net
unconditional and conditional approval rates is lower than the relative prot ratio between
the remedy and the strict regimes, or, equivalently, the prot from merger weighted by the
net probability of approval is higher with rather than without remedies.
Note that if there is no change in the probability of an unconditional clearance ( = 0),
then those mergers that would have been cleared with remedies will be banned. Then it is
no surprise that as long as the increase in the probability of a clearance is su¢ ciently low,
abolishing remedies will make a merger less protable. Note also that the larger the prot
with remedies relative to that from an unconditional approval, the less likely that the scenario
with no remedies would make mergers more protable.
Two additional conclusions may be drawn from the expected protability comparison
between the two merger policy regimes, with and without remedies.
On the one hand, for a given number of merger investigations, it is straightforward to
see that allowing for remedies may trigger more mergers being submitted. Denote y(N)
and y(N) the "critical" or "marginal" mergers in the "strict" and the "remedy" regimes
respectively, i.e. y(N) such that ES(y; N) = 0 and y(N) such that ER(y; N) = 0.
Then for a given N , y(N) ? y(N) as long as 
R(y)
M (y)
? .
On the other hand, one may equally draw a comparison of the CAs activity ensuring the
same number of mergers being submitted in the two regimes (i.e. compare NS and NR such
that y(NS) = y(NR)):
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- let y(NS) be such that ES(y; NS) = 0, M (y) 1 NS +NSg(y)+NSM (y)h(y) =
C; this yields NS = 
M (1 g) hM
M C as the activity level leading to y
 in the strict, no-remedy
regime.
- let now y(NR) be such that ER(y; NR) = 0 , M (y) 1 NR +NRg(y) +
NRR(y)h(y) = C; then NR = 
M (1 g) hR
M C is the agencys investigation frequency leading
to y in the merger policy regime allowing for remedies.
Assuming that y = y, one gets that NR > NS ,  < R(y)
M (y)
. Summing up yields the
following:
Corollary 1 I¤  < 
R(y)
M (y)
, then:
(i) y(N) > y(N), for a given N : the remedy regime leads to more mergers being
submitted for a given level of activity on behalf of the CA;
(ii) NR > NS if y = y: in order to keep constant the number of mergers being
submitted, the CA must be "more active"/investigate more often when remedies are possible.
Merger deterrence when remedies apply
Following the above discussion it is clear that when facing a non-zero probability of
investigation, some merger projects will not be submitted by the rms because they expect
a ban. The question we tackle now is precisely which merger projects will be thus deterred.
For this, one needs to consider how the expected prot from merger depends on the merger
type y.
Consider the "strict", no-remedy regime. The worst, most anticompetitive mergers will
not be submitted if @E
S(y)
@y < 0, @
M
@y

1 N +NgS(y)+M (y)N @gS(y)@y < 0. Re-writing
this expression yields
@M
@y
M (y)
<
  @gS(y)
@y
N
1 N+NgS , which we can interpret as follows: the relative
prot increase from submitting a more anticompetitive merger (the LHS term) must be lower
than the relative change in the probability to see the merger accepted (the RHS term). This
leads to the Proposition 1 in Sørgard (2009), according to which in the strict, no-remedy
regime, under the assumption that mergers with a larger negative welfare impact face a
higher probability of ban (@g
S
@y < 0), a su¢ cient condition for the "right deterrence" to occur,
i.e. the worst mergers not being submitted, is that @
M
@y  0:
In other words, as long as the screening performed by the agency is good enough (i.e.
the more anticompetitive the merger, the higher the likelihood of a ban), then the right
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deterrence is achieved as soon as there is a negative relationship between the mergers type y
and its prot (meaning that the more pro-competitive the merger, the more protable it is).
In short, as long as the worst mergers have lower chances of approval, they will be deterred
if they are also relatively less protable. As emphasized by Sørgard (2009), empirical studies
do not necessarily support this negative relationship, but the important conclusion to reach
is that the quality or performance of merger control depends on which merger projects are
actually deterred.
The possibility of a conditional approval is likely to impact on the factors enabling the
"right" deterrence, and we discuss this next.
Proposition 2 When allowing for remedies, the "right" deterrence obtains, i.e. the most
welfare-detrimental mergers are abandoned, if
 
@M
@y
M (y)
+
N
@g(y)
@y
1 N+Ng < 0
!
\
 
@R
@y
R(y)
+
@h(y)
@y
h < 0
!
.
As long as mergers with a larger negative welfare impact face a higher probability of ban, a
su¢ cient condition for the "right" deterrence is that

@M
@y < 0

\

@R
@y < 0

.
Proof. Under the remedy regime, the worst mergers will be deterred if @E
R(y)
@y < 0 ,
@M
@y [1 N +Ng] + M (y)N @g(y)@y + @
R
@y Nh+
R(y)N @h(y)@y < 0. Equivalently,
M (y) [1 N +Ng]
 
@M
@y
M (y)
+
N
@g(y)
@y
1 N+Ng
!
+R(y)Nh
 
@R
@y
R(y)
+
@h(y)
@y
h
!
< 0; where @g(y)@y <
0 and @h(y)@y < 0 as well.
In short, it all comes down to the same negative relationship between the merger type and
its prot, but extended to take into account the prot made in case of conditional approval.
Let us now nally compare the conditions ensuring the "right" deterrence between the
two merger policy regimes:
under the strict, no-remedy regime, it writes
@M
@y
[1 N +Ng] + M (y)N @g(y)
@y

+N

@M
@y
h+M (y)
@h
@y

< 0;
whereas when remedies are possible it writes
@M
@y
[1 N +Ng] + M (y)N @g(y)
@y

+N

@R
@y
h+R(y)
@h(y)
@y

< 0:
It is easy to see the su¢ cient condition for the latter,

@M
@y < 0

\

@R
@y < 0

, implies
the su¢ cient condition for the former (@
M
@y < 0). Thus, the following holds:
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Corollary 2 If the worst mergers are abandoned when the remedies are allowed, then they
are necessarily deterred when the conditional approval is not available.
One way to interpret Corollary 2 is to say that under the previously identied su¢ cient
conditions, giving up remedies is not costly in terms of achieving the "right" deterrence.
However, this tells nothing about the welfare impact of switching from one merger policy
regime to the other, and this is what we tackle next.
4 Impact of remedies on welfare
At the rst stage of the game, the CA determines its activity level or frequency of investigation
N by maximizing its objective function. Let us detail below the expression of the CAs
objective in each regime.
In the "strict", no-remedy regime, the CA maximizes an expected welfare equal to:7
ESW =
Z y(N)
0

(1 N)WM (y) +NgS(y)WM (y) dy: (3)
The integral stands for what may be termed as a direct gain from enforcing the merger
policy, namely the welfare e¤ect from both mergers that are submitted and not investigated
and those that are investigated and cleared.8
When remedies are allowed, the CAs objective becomes:
ERW =
Z y(N)
0

(1 N)WM (y) +N  WM (y)g(y) +WR(y)h(y) dy: (4)
The interpretation of the two integrals is roughly the same, except that part of the direct
welfare gain from enforcing the merger policy (the rst term) comes now from the merger
projects that are conditionally cleared when investigated. This possibility also modies the
marginally deterred merger (hence y instead of y).
Welfare comparison between the two regimes
7Remember that we assume that a ban has a zero welfare impact.
8Note that we can leave out from the social welfare function a second integral,
R y
y(N)W
M (y)dy, corre-
sponding to the expected welfare from the indirect, deterrent e¤ect of merger policy, since all mergers between
y(N) and y are abandoned.
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Before discussing the maximization and its outcome as such, the mere comparison of the
CAs objective function in the two possible regimes provides some interesting insights:
Lemma 1 Assume that the same number of mergers are submitted in both regimes, i.e.
y = y. Then ERW ? ESW i¤  7 WR
WM
.
Proof. Rewrite ESW as
R y(N)
0 W
M (y) [1 N +Ng(y)] dy + R y(N)0 WM (y)Nh(y)dy.
Then for y = y it is straightforward to see that ERW ? ESW i¤  7 WR
WM
.
In other words, in the case of equal deterrence, Lemma 1 states that the expected
welfare comparison between both regimes simply comes down to the comparison between
 = g
S g
h and the relative welfare threshold
WR
WM
, or equivalently, between the ratio of net
unconditional/conditional approval rates and the ratio of relative social gain from merger.
In particular, the possibility of remedies lowers the expected welfare i¤ the social gain
from merger weighted by the net probability of clearance is higher under the strict regime
(ERW < ESW , (gS   g)WM > hWR). This is quite intuitive: given the assumption of
equal number of mergers submitted under both regimes, the di¤erence between the two ex-
pected welfare functions only comes from the change in approval rates, or more precisely, the
transformation of unconditional into conditional clearances for part of the submitted mergers.
So as soon as the welfare change from this can be signed, the expected welfare comparison is
straightforward.
The same comparison of objective functions between the two regimes may be further
exploited to obtain the following:
Lemma 2 If  ? R
M
, then a su¢ cient condition for ERW 7 ESW is that  ? WR
WM
.
Proof. Recall that  ? R
M
, y(N) 7 y(N) for a given N , and in this caseR y(N)
0

WM (y)(1 N +Ng(y)) dy 7 R y(N)0 WM (y) [1 N +Ng(y)] dy. Then in order
for ERW 7 ESW , it is enough to have
R y(N)
0 W
R(y)Nh(y)dy 7
R y(N)
0 W
M (y)Nh(y)dy,
and for this a su¢ cient condition is  ? WR
WM
:
Assume no longer the same deterrence between the two regimes. Then Lemma 2 states
that the comparison between  and the relative welfare threshold W
R
WM
su¢ ces to compare
the two regimes in terms of expected welfare. For instance, if one considers the limit case
y(N) = y(N) ,  = R
M
, it is straightforward to check that ERW > ESW if  < W
R
WM
,
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as shown in Lemma 1. Therefore Lemma 2 provides the outcome of the expected welfare
comparison in a more general case as compared with Lemma 1, i.e. without assuming equal
deterrence between the two regimes, but at the cost of lessening the condition enabling this
comparison (only a su¢ cient condition instead of the necessary and su¢ cient condition of
Lemma 1). Nonetheless, the intuition follows the same reasoning: as long as one can rank
the degree of deterrence achieved under each regime, i.e. y(N) 7 y(N), then the expected
welfare comparison will be basically dictated by the comparison between the welfare from
merger weighted by the respective net probability to see the merger materialize, with or
without remedies ((gS   g)WM 7 hWR).
Finally, note that if ERW ? ESW , then necessarily ERW (N) ? ESW (N), where N
and N denote the CAs optimal choices of activity levels or frequency of investigation with
and without remedies respectively. However, this tells us nothing on the comparison between
these optimal choices, i.e. N ? N. For this we shall examine next the outcome of the
maximization problem for the CA.
5 Impact of remedies on the optimal activity level
5.1 Enforcement and deterrence e¤ects
In the case of the "strict", no-remedy regime, the maximization of the CAs objective function
requires a FOC that writes as follows:
@ESW
@N
=
Z y(N)
0
 
gS(y)  1WM (y) dy +WM (y) 1 N +NgS(y) dy
dN
= 0: (5)
The optimal choice N in terms of activity level (or frequency of investigation) for the
CA strikes the balance between the expected marginal gain of increasing the investigation
activity (the LHS term of the FOC) and the corresponding marginal cost, normalized here to
zero (the RHS term). Following Sørgard (2009), the marginal gain from launching one more
merger investigation is itself composed of two distinct parts, called the enforcement and the
deterrence e¤ects. These are the rst and second term of the above FOC respectively. Let us
recall their interpretation. The enforcement e¤ect, equal to
R y(N)
0
 
gS(y)  1WM (y) dy,
represents the net welfare impact of a ban following an investigation. The deterrence e¤ect,
which is equal to WM (y)

1 N +NgS(y) dydN , represents the outcome of the increased
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frequency of investigation for the number of mergers actually submitted, and thereby on
expected welfare. Again, following Sørgard (2009), in particular Proposition 2, it is easy
to check that if the worst mergers are abandoned in presence of merger control (i.e. the
"right deterrence" is achieved), then in equilibrium the deterrence e¤ect is positive while the
enforcement e¤ect is negative provided that WM (y) < 0. In other words, the CA faces a
trade-o¤ when deciding how many mergers to investigate: a higher frequency deters more
mergers, which is welfare improving if the deterred mergers are detrimental to welfare, but
one more investigation may lead to the ban of a welfare-increasing merger as well. The cost of
increasing the frequency of investigation, in the hope of avoiding type II errors (i.e. clearing
detrimental mergers) is the possibility of making type I errors (banning pro-competitive ones).
The equilibrium is met when the last deterred merger is detrimental to welfare, WM (y) < 0,
leading to a positive deterrence e¤ect and a negative enforcement e¤ect9 in equilibrium.
When allowing for remedies, the FOC on the CAs objective function writes as follows:
@ERW
@N
=
Z y(N)
0

(g(y)  1)WM (y) + h(y)WR(y) dy
+

WM (y) (1 N +Ng(y)) +Nh(y)WR(y) dy
dN
= 0: (6)
It is easy to note that when allowing for remedies, both the enforcement and the deterrence
e¤ects are a¤ected. Part of the enforcement e¤ect is now due to the welfare impact of a
conditional approval instead of an unconditional approval (the term
R y(N)
0 h(y)W
R(y)dy),
while part of the deterrence e¤ect comes now from the welfare impact of some mergers being
abandoned although the conditional approval was available (the term Nh(y)WR(y)dy

dN ).
The CAs optimal choice of an activity level when remedies are available, N, will obvi-
ously depend on the sign of the two above-mentioned e¤ects. The latter are in turn determined
by the characteristics of the last merger to be submitted/deterred. Thus the following result
holds:
Lemma 3 Assume the "right" deterrence under the remedies regime. Then 9!N 2 (0; 1)
i¤ the enforcement and the deterrence e¤ect have opposite signs in equilibrium. In particular:
(i) a su¢ cient condition for the enforcement e¤ect to be negative and the deterrence
e¤ect to be positive in equilibrium is that the last merger to be deterred is detrimental, with
9The latter stays negative as long as the marginal cost of investigations is su¢ ciently low.
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or without remedies;
(ii) a su¢ cient condition for the enforcement e¤ect to be positive and the deterrence e¤ect
to be negative in equilibrium is that the last merger to be deterred is welfare-improving, with
or without remedies.
Proof. Merger protability is decreasing in N , so from the expected prot function
ER(y) one can easily derive that the "right" deterrence, i.e. @E
R(y)
@y < 0, implies
dy
dN < 0:
Thus the rst part of Lemma 3 is trivial to derive from (6). Rewriting the latter as follows:Z y(N)
0

(g(y)  1)WM (y) + h(y)WR(y) dy| {z }
enforcement e¤ect
=  dy

dN| {z }
>0
24 WM (y) [1 N +Ng(y)]
+Nh(y)WR(y)
35
indicates that sign(enforcement e¤ect)= sign

[1 N +Ng(y)]WM (y) +Nh(y)WR(y).
A su¢ cient condition for signing the enforcement e¤ect in equilibrium, and thereby the de-
terrence e¤ect as well, is that signWM (y) = signWR(y).
According to point (i) of Lemma 3, as long as the "right" deterrence is achieved by investi-
gating mergers, the deterrence e¤ect when remedies are available is positive in equilibrium i¤
WM (y) [1 N +Ng(y)] +Nh(y)WR(y) < 0. It is straightforward to see that a su¢ -
cient condition for the deterrence e¤ect to be positive is thatWM (y) < 0 andWR(y) < 0,
meaning the last deterred merger would have been detrimental to welfare if cleared, with or
without remedies. In this case, given the normalization of the marginal investigation cost to
zero, the enforcement e¤ect is negative in equilibrium - thus we provide here an extension of
Sørgard (2009) to the case of conditional approvals.
The detailed expression of the enforcement e¤ect reects the trade-o¤ leading to an in-
terior solution in terms of merger investigation rate when WM (y) < 0 and WR(y) < 0:R y(N)
0

(g(y)  1)WM (y) + h(y)WR(y) dy
=
R y0
0 (g(y)  1)WM (y)| {z }
>0
dy+
R y
y0 (g(y)  1)WM (y)| {z }
<0
dy+
R y00
0 h(y)W
R(y)| {z }
>0
dy+
R y
y00 h(y)W
R(y)| {z }
<0
dy,
where y0 is such thatWM (y0) = 0 and y00 is such thatWR(y00) = 0. A negative enforcement
e¤ect is due to the substantial wrongful bans (
R y0
0 (g(y)  1)WM (y)| {z }
>0
dy < 0) and wrongful
conditional approvals (
R y
y00 h(y)W
R(y)| {z }
<0
dy < 0). This is the opportunity cost of further in-
creasing on the margin the control rate N , whose "benet" is the positive deterrence e¤ect
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(since all deterred mergers y  y were harmful, with or without remedies: WM (y) < 0
and WR(y) < 0).10
Point (ii) in Lemma 3 deals with the opposite case: still assuming the "right" deter-
rence, the enforcement e¤ect is positive and the deterrence e¤ect is negative in equilibrium
i¤WM (y) [1 N +Ng(y)] +Nh(y)WR(y) > 0. Again, a su¢ cient condition for this
is that WM (y) > 0 and WR(y) > 0, meaning the last deterred merger would have been
welfare-improving, with or without remedies. In other words, some of the deterred mergers
were actually pro-competitive, and the CA obviously made type I errors. This requires in
turn the enforcement e¤ect to be positive in equilibrium.
To see the intuition for this, it is useful to recall that when remedies are available, the
enforcement e¤ect is the sum of the welfare e¤ects from bans and conditional approvals
that take place instead of unconditional clearings. Therefore, despite the fact that these
bans are now clearly type I errors, they are nonetheless compensated by the welfare gain
from conditional approvals, since all submitted mergers to the last are welfare-improving if
conditionally accepted. Equivalently, the deterrence e¤ect is negative in equilibrium, because
increasing marginally the frequency of investigation will trigger even more mergers to be
abandoned, although they could have been conditionally cleared and thereby increase welfare
(since WR(y) > 0).
It is thus important to note that the remedy regime modies the composition of both the
enforcement and deterrence e¤ects as compared with the strict, no-remedy regime. Inciden-
tally, this enables a more complete denition of the CAs optimal activity level. The mere
fact that conditional approvals are available indicates that the CAs decision errors also apply
to them: some mergers are deterred although they might have been conditionally cleared,
whereas other mergers are no longer banned but conditionally approved. The welfare impact
of these decisions now enters the CAs trade-o¤, and Lemma 3 identies two polar cases that
are compatible with an interior solution in terms of the CAs optimal activity level.
The most important remark deals however with the interpretation of the two cases, (i)
10Alternatively, the intuition is easy to grasp by considering the limit case where WR(y) = 0. In that case
a remedy will x the harm for the marginal merger, which will therefore imply for it a zero impact on welfare.
The resulting situation is analogous to Sørgard (2009): the conditional approval will have exactly the same
deterrence e¤ect on welfare as a ban, and thus the last merger being deterred leads to a welfare improvement
because it is a detrimental merger.
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and (ii). Consider for instance the "neutral" merger dened by WM (y0) = 0. Then case
(i), where WM (y) < 0, corresponds to all mergers y  y being submitted, although part
of them are welfare-decreasing (y0  y < y). In other words, not all submitted mergers
are welfare-improving, but all the deterred mergers were welfare-decreasing, and therefore
the CAs optimal activity level N is compatible with under-deterrence, to the extent the
imperfect merger screening allows some of the anti-competitive mergers to be submitted.
In turn, case (ii), for which WM (y) > 0, has all the mergers such that y 2 (y; y0]
abandoned. Therefore all submitted mergers are welfare-improving, but all deterred mergers
were not welfare-decreasing. The CAs optimal activity level N is now compatible with
over-deterrence, since the imperfect merger screening deters some welfare-improving mergers.
At any rate, and as before mentioned, the possibility of a conditional approval modies
both sides of the trade-o¤ that the CA faces, i.e. the enforcement and the deterrence e¤ects.
As a result, it is likely that the optimal choice of an activity level will di¤er between the two
regimes.
5.2 Comparing the optimal activity levels assuming equal deterrence be-
tween regimes
Let us for the time being assume that the same number of mergers is submitted in both
regimes. For the sake of the comparison between the two FOCs, let us rewrite below the one
in the case of the "strict", no-remedy regimes, by using gS = g + h:
@ESW
@N
=
Z y(N)
0

(g(y)  1)WM (y) + h(y)WM (y) dy
+

WM (y) (1 N +Ng(y)) +WM (y)Nh(y) dy
dN
= 0: (7)
Then, based on (6) and (7), the following holds:
Lemma 4 For y = y, then N ? N i¤  ? WR
WM
.
Proof. Denote  the di¤erence between the two FOCs when y(N) = y(N). Then
 = @E
SW
@N

y=y
  @ERW@N

y=y
=
R y(N)
0 h(y)W
M (y)dy +WM (y)Nh(y)dy

dN

y=y
 
R y(N)
0 h(y)W
R(y)dy +Nh(y)WR(y)dy

dN

y=y
.
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If  > W
R
WM
, then  > 0, N < N since the the expected welfare functions are concave
in N .
If  < W
R
WM
, then  < 0, N > N following the same argument.
In other words, we have identied a su¢ cient condition to rank the CAs optimal activity
levels with and without remedies available, provided that the same deterrence is achieved
under both regimes. According to Lemma 4, this su¢ cient condition is, again, the comparison
between , the change rate from net unconditional approvals into conditional ones, and the
relative welfare ratio W
R
WM
. To grasp the intuition, it is useful to follow the proof and recall
that the comparison of optimal activity levels between the two regimes results from that of
the rst order conditions on the respective expected welfare functions. Leaving aside the
di¤erence in the number of mergers submitted under each regime, expressions (6) and (7)
di¤er in as much as part of the enforcement e¤ect is due to the welfare impact of mergers
no longer banned but conditionally accepted, WM (y) ? WR(y), and by the same token,
part of the deterrence e¤ect is due to those mergers that are abandoned but might have been
conditionally, instead of unconditionally, cleared (WR(y) ? WM (y)). When both regimes
yield the same expected protability for merger projects, i.e. y = y, the remaining relevant
comparison is the one between the welfare gains from merger, weighted by the respective net
approval rates: (gS   g)WM 7 hWR.
Finally, taking into account both Lemma 1 and Lemma 4, the following obtains:
Corollary 3 Assume that the same number of mergers is submitted under both regimes. I¤
 ? WR
WM
; then N ? N and ESW ? ERW as well.
Equivalently, in the particular case of identical expected merger protability (y = y),
meaning  = 
R(y)
M (y)
following Proposition 1 and the discussion preceding Corollary 1, the
sign of the di¤erence between the relative increases in prots and welfare levels respectively
( 
R(y)
M (y)
  WR(y)
WM (y)
? 0) directly indicates the ranking of the optimal activity levels for the
CA and the resulting expected welfare levels as well. The intuition is simple: recall that
identical expected merger protability also means identical deterrence, and therefore the
relative gain from enforcing a given regime only comes from minimizing the type II errors, or
false approvals. This explains the direct relationship between the optimal activity level and
the expected welfare (N ? N and ESW ? ERW as well): a more intense control activity
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prevents more anticompetitive mergers and thereby yields a higher welfare.
5.3 A full-edged comparison of optimal investigation frequencies
However, for a general comparison of the optimal activity levels, it is necessary to relax the
assumption of equal deterrence under both regimes. In order to compare the two FOCs
when y 6= y, one may use their monotonicity and consider evaluating one of them at the
optimal activity level corresponding to the other regime. For instance, if @E
SW
@N

N
? 0,
then N 7 N. This leads to the following:
Proposition 3 Assume that the most detrimental mergers are deterred. Then:
(i) for  < 
R
M
and  < W
R
WM
, d(y
 y)
dN

N
< 0 is a su¢ cient condition to have N < N;
(ii) for  > 
R
M
and  > W
R
WM
, d(y
 y)
dN

N
> 0 is a su¢ cient condition to have N >
N;
(iii) for  > 
R
M
and  < W
R
WM
, WM (y) > 0 and d(y
 y)
dN

N
> 0 are su¢ cient
conditions to have N < N;
(iv) for  < 
R
M
and  > W
R
WM
, WM (y) < 0 and d(y
 y)
dN

N
< 0 are su¢ cient condi-
tions to have N > N:
See proof in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 provides su¢ cient conditions to rank the optimal activity levels between
both merger control regimes when merger investigations deter the most welfare-detrimental
merger projects, but the two regimes do not equally deter.
The cases displayed in Proposition 3 di¤er in terms of conditions enabling the comparison
of optimal activity levels. The rst two cases identied correspond to the situations where
the private and public incentives due to merger control are each time compatible: higher
merger protability and higher social gain from controlling merger for the remedy regime
in case (i), and the opposite in case (ii). This lack of conict between private and public
incentives goes along with a unique and quite simple su¢ cient condition for comparing the
optimal investigation rates between regimes: the local monotonicity of the deterrence gap,
or, alternatively, the impact of an innitesimal increase in the investigation frequency on
the deterrence or merger protability di¤erential in the vicinity of the optimal activity level
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of the remedy regime11. In turn, the two remaining cases deal with situations where the
private and public incentives regarding mergers are not aligned: lower merger protability
but higher social welfare from controlling mergers and allowing for remedies in case (iii),
and higher merger incentives but lower social gain for the remedy regime in case (iv). In
order to compare the optimal investigation rates between regimes, such conicting incentives
require a further su¢ cient condition, beyond signing the marginal deterrence gap. Formally,
this additional su¢ cient condition deals with the type of the marginal merger in the strict,
no-remedy regime, but it basically comes down to the occurrence of either under- or over-
deterrence in equilibrium.
Let us provide the intuition for the results displayed in Proposition 3.
Consider case (i): it identies the remedy regime as the one where mergers are less deterred
in absolute terms ( < 
R
M
, y > y), and also as the regime yielding a higher social gain
from controlling mergers (WM < WR , (gS   g)WM < hWR indicates that the merger
welfare e¤ect, weighted by the net approval rate, is higher in the remedy regime). As before
mentioned, this is a case of aligned incentives, with the remedy regimes being preferredby
both the merging rms and the competition authority. We nd that the optimal investigation
rate will be higher with remedies, N > N; provided that the marginal deterrence goes the
same way as the absolute deterrence ( d(y
 y)
dN

N
< 0 means that y diminishes faster than
y when one more investigation is launched, indicating a slowerdeterrence when remedies
are available). In other words, the competition agency can a¤ord to conduct a more active
merger policy in the remedy regime, given the lower reactivity of rms to its intervention
(i.e. the lower, both absolute and marginal, deterrence, and hence the lower opportunity cost
induced), and will optimally choose to do so, since the social gain from controlling mergers
is higher.
The same type of argument goes for case (ii), which deals with the symmetrically opposite
situation in terms of aligned incentives.
Let us turn now to cases (iii) and (iv), which exhibit in contrast conicting incentives
between the rms and the agency. For instance, in case (iii), the merger protability is lower
(or, equivalently, the absolute deterrence is higher), but the social welfare from controlling
mergers is higher when remedies are available:  > 
R
M
, y < y but WM < WR ,
11Equivalently, we call this the marginal deterrence gap.
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(gS g)WM < hWR:We nd that the CA will optimally be more active in controlling mergers
when remedies are allowed, N > N; provided that the marginal deterrence goes the same
way as the absolute deterrence ( d(y
 y)
dN

N
> 0 means that y diminishes faster than y
when one more investigation is launched, indicating a quicker deterrence when remedies
are available), and also provided that the optimal investigation rates induce over-deterrence
(WM (y) > 0 leads to WR(y) > 0, WM (y) > 0 and WR(y) > 0). The intuition is the
following: despite the higher reactivityof rms when remedies are available (higher absolute
and marginal deterrence), the CA will be more active in controlling mergers as compared with
the strict, no-remedy regime, because the social gain from its public intervention is higher
(WM < WR). This holds as long as allowing for remedies does not lead to more wrongful
approvals, or type II errors: WM (y) > 0, WR(y) > 0, WM (y) > 0 and WR(y) > 0
indicate that the remedy regime replicates the outcome of over-deterrence in equilibrium
obtained under the strict regime, meaning that all submitted mergers in equilibrium (i.e. for
N and N respectively) are welfare-improving, therefore no type II errors are possible.
In contrast, case (iv) has the CA optimally control fewer mergers in the remedy regime
(N > N) because the gain from its intervention is lower (WM > WR , (gS   g)WM >
hWR indicates that the merger welfare gain, weighted by the net approval rate, is lower in the
remedy regime). This holds however whenever the strict regime exhibits higher deterrence,
both absolute ( < 
R
M
, y > y), and marginal ( d(y y)dN

N
< 0 means that y dimin-
ishes faster than y when one more investigation is launched), although the optimal investiga-
tion rates actually induce under-deterrence (WM (y) < 0 leads toWR(y) < 0;WM (y) < 0
andWR(y) < 0 as well). Basically, the under-deterrence outcome indicates that all deterred
mergers were welfare-decreasing, but all submitted mergers are not welfare-improving, there-
fore the imperfect merger control leads to type II errors (wrongful clearances, with or without
remedies). As a result, the CA will optimally be less active when allowing for remedies as
long as the remedy regime replicates the under-deterrence obtained under the strict regime,
given the lower reactivity of rms to public intervention and the lower gain obtained from
controlling mergers when conditional approvals are possible.
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6 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this article has been to discuss the possible welfare e¤ects of merger remedies.
We show that allowing for merger remedies has a non-trivial e¤ect on the incentives to merge,
the agencys merger control activity level as well as the welfare e¤ect of merger control.
Let us relate our results to the empirical ndings in the literature. Although the empirical
ndings are limited, it is shown in Seldeslachts et al. (2009) that more clearances conditional
on remedies tends to increase the number of proposed mergers. Although remedies might be
good for enforcement - for example solving a merger with remedies can be better than banning
it - our analysis indicates that their impact on deterrence might be crucial. First, introducing
remedies might imply that some of the worst mergers would suddenly be protable to propose.
If so, we are no longer deterring the right mergers. Second, a regime with merger remedies
can - as the empirical study indicates - lead to more mergers being proposed. This will lead
to less deterrence on the margin, unless there is a su¢ ciently large increase in the agencys
merger control activity.
Our analysis has important implications for how we should test empirically the e¤ect of
remedies. There are several empirical studies that question the welfare e¤ects of imposing
remedies. However, all these studies consider only the enforcement e¤ect - either of behavioral
or structural remedies applied in specic merger control cases. We point out that this might
not capture the potentially most important problem associated with remedies. It might lead
to less deterrence of mergers that on the margin are detrimental to welfare, and even a shift
in direction of the worst mergers no longer being deterred.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.
Recall that @E
SW
@N =
R y(N)
0

(g(y)  1)WM (y) + h(y)WM (y) dy
+

WM (y) [1 N +Ng(y)] +WM (y)Nh(y) dydN
and that N is such that @E
RW
@N =
R y(N)
0

(g(y)  1)WM (y) + h(y)WR(y) dy
+

WM (y) [1 N +Ng(y)] +Nh(y)WR(y) dydN = 0:
Therefore @E
SW
@N

N
=
R y(N)
0 (g(y)  1)WM (y)dy +
R y(N)
0 h(y)W
M (y)dy
+ dy

dN

N
WM (y) [1 N +Ng(y)] + dydN

N
Nh(y)WM (y):
(i) let  < 
R
M
(i.e. y > y) and  < W
R
WM
Then
R y(N)
0 (g(y)  1)WM (y)dy +
R y(N)
0 h(y)W
M (y)dy
<
R y(N)
0

(g(y)  1)WM (y) + h(y)WR(y) dy
=   WM (y) [1 N +Ng(y)] +Nh(y)WR(y) dydN
therefore @E
SW
@N

N
< dy

dN

N
WM (y)

1 N +Ng(y) +Nh(y)WR(y)
  dydN

N

WM (y) (1 N +Ng(y)) +Nh(y)WR(y) dydN N
< [(1 N) +N(g(y) + h(y))]

WM (y) dy

dN

N
  WR(y) dy

dN

N

;
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thanks to  < W
R
WM
; dy

dN

N
< 0,   dydN

N
> 0, and the monotonicity of WM ;WR; g;
and h:
In order for @E
SW
@N

N
< 0, leading to N > N, it is enough to have
WM (y) dy

dN

N
  WR(y) dy

dN

N

< 0 ,
dy
dN

N
dy
dN

N
< W
R(y)
WM (y) , and since  <
WR
WM
; a
su¢ cient condition for this is
dy
dN

N
dy
dN

N
< 1.
(ii) let  > 
R
M
and  > W
R
WM
Thanks to  > 
R
M
, i.e. y < y; dy

dN

N
< 0,   dydN

N
> 0, and the monotonicity of
WM ;WR; g; and h, one has that:
@ESW
@N

N
> dy

dN

N
(WM (y) [1 N +Ng(y)] +Nh(y)WM (y))
  WM (y) (1 N +Ng(y)) +Nh(y)WR(y) dydN N
> dy

dN

N
WM (y) (1 N +Ng(y) +Nh(y))
  dydN

N
WR(y)
 (1 N +Ng(y) +Nh(y))
= (1 N +Ng(y) +Nh(y))

dy
dN

N
WM (y)  dydN

N
WR(y)


:
Then @E
SW
@N

N
> 0 if dy

dN

N
WM (y)  dydN

N
WR(y)
 > 0, and for this a su¢ cient
condition is that dy

dN

N
> dy

dN

N
since  > W
R
WM
.
(iii) let  > 
R
M
and  < W
R
WM
Thanks to  > 
R
M
, i.e. y < y and the monotonicity of WM ;WR; g; and h, one has
that:
@ESW
@N

N
<
R y(N)
0

(g(y)  1)WM (y) + h(y)WM (y) dy
+ dy

dN

N
WM (y) [1 N +Ng(y)] + dydN

N
Nh(y)WR(y)
=
R y(N)
0

(g(y)  1)WM (y) + h(y)WM (y) dy
  R y(N)0 (g(y)  1)WM (y) + h(y)WR(y) dy dydN

N
dy
dN

N
:
Then @E
SW
@N

N
< 0 (i.e. N > N) if
R y(N)
0

(g(y)  1)WM (y) + h(y)WM (y) dy
  R y(N)0 (g(y)  1)WM (y) + h(y)WR(y) dy dydN

N
dy
dN

N
< 0
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,
R y(N)
0 [(g(y) 1)WM (y)+h(y)WM (y)]dyR y(N)
0 [(g(y) 1)WM (y)+h(y)WR(y)]dy
<
dy
dN

N
dy
dN

N
:
Note that
R y(N)
0

(g(y)  1)WM (y) + h(y)WR(y) dy
>
R y(N)
0

(g(y)  1)WM (y) + h(y)WM (y) dy because  < WR
WM
.
Thus
R y(N)
0 [(g(y) 1)WM (y)+h(y)WM (y)]dyR y(N)
0 [(g(y) 1)WM (y)+h(y)WR(y)]dy
<
R y(N)
0 [(g(y) 1)WM (y)+h(y)WM (y)]dyR y(N)
0 [(g(y) 1)WM (y)+h(y)WM (y)]dy
< 1 as
long as
R y(N)
0

(g(y)  1)WM (y) + h(y)WM (y) dy > 0, for which WM (y) > 0 is a su¢ -
cient condition. Then it is enough to have 1 <
dy
dN

N
dy
dN

N
for @E
SW
@N

N
< 0 (i.e. N > N).
(iv) let  < 
R
M
(i.e. y > y) and  > W
R
WM
Then dy

dN

N
WM (y) [1 N +Ng(y)] + dydN

N
Nh(y)WM (y)
> dy

dN

N
WM (y) [1 N +Ng(y)] + dydN

N
Nh(y)WR(y)
thanks to  > W
R
WM
and the monotonicity of WM ;WR; g; and h;
butWM (y) [1 N +Ng(y)]+Nh(y)WR(y) =  
R y(N)
0 [(g(y) 1)WM (y)+h(y)WR(y)]dy
dy
dN

N
therefore @E
SW
@N

N
>
R y(N)
0

(g(y)  1)WM (y) + h(y)WM (y) dy
 
dy
dN

N
dy
dN

N
R y(N)
0

(g(y)  1)WM (y) + h(y)WR(y) dy:
Then @E
SW
@N

N
> 0, i.e. N < N, if
R y(N)
0 [(g(y) 1)WM (y)+h(y)WM (y)]dyR y(N)
0 [(g(y) 1)WM (y)+h(y)WR(y)]dy
>
dy
dN

N
dy
dN

N
:
Assume WM (y) < 0: This leads to WR(y) < 0 as well, since  > W
R
WM
, but also
WM (y) < 0 and WR(y) < 0 since y > y and WM and WR are decreasing in y.
Consequently, given y > y; one has that
R y(N)
0

(g(y)  1)WM (y) + h(y)WR(y) dy
=
R y(N)
0

(g(y)  1)WM (y) + h(y)WR(y) dy+Z y(N)
y(N)

(g(y)  1)WM (y) + h(y)WR(y) dy| {z }
<0
<
R y(N)
0

(g(y)  1)WM (y) + h(y)WR(y) dy:
Thus
R y(N)
0 [(g(y) 1)WM (y)+h(y)WM (y)]dyR y(N)
0 [(g(y) 1)WM (y)+h(y)WR(y)]dy
>
R y(N)
0 [(g(y) 1)WM (y)+h(y)WM (y)]dyR y(N)
0 [(g(y) 1)WM (y)+h(y)WR(y)]dy
> 1 since
 > W
R
WM
.
A further su¢ cient condition to eventually have @E
SW
@N

N
> 0, i.e. N < N, is
1 >
dy
dN

N
dy
dN

N
:
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